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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
proper are to deprive an insane or otherwise incapable individual
of the care and management of his affairs for his own good and
to make possible the appointment of a curator to administer the
estate. In the instant case there can be little doubt that the
defendant had some interests in this state requiring administra-
tion, otherwise the petition for interdiction probably would not
have been filed. And there can hardly be better evidence of the
inability to care for one's affairs than mental unsoundness justi-
fying actual commitment for over nineteen years.
The writer will go so far as to say that in his opinion neither
domicile nor presence is essential to the legislative and judicial
competence of this state in interdiction cases if the person has
interests in this state which need administration. Even Article
392 of the Civil Code, which states "Every interdiction shall be
pronounced by the competent judge of the domicile or residence
of the person to be interdicted," would seem to refer to intrastate
or interparish domicile or residence, and therefore to venue
rather than to jurisdiction. If the person is not domiciled or resid-
ing in the state, there is no question of its application.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
SERVITUDES
There have been many instances in which a Louisiana land-
owner conveys or grants a right-of-way across his property, but
the so-called "right-of-way" does not per se identify fully the
relationship or the rights of the parties. This uncertainty results
from the failure of the parties to realize or to specify whether
the transaction is a transfer of ownership or the establishment
of a servitude. In the absence of a clearly expressed intent to
transfer ownership of the strip of land, the court has treated the
right-of-way as a servitude. Accordingly, in Bonnabel v. Police
Jury, Parish of Jefferson1 the court held that the right-of-way
was a servitude and had been extinguished by the prescription
of ten years non-use, even where the deed used the following
language: "sell, transfer, convey, assign, set over and deliver...
a right-of-way ... which right-of-way is hereby conveyed, trans-
ferred, assigned and delivered unto said grantee . . . in per-
petuity to have and retain the absolute title to same ..
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 216 La. 798, 44 So. 2d 872 (1950).
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The redundant multiplication of words of conveyances can-
not add any strength to a transaction where the subject matter
is inadequately described as a "right-of-way." It would greatly
clarify the situation if the deed had described the subject matter
specifically as a transfer of perfect ownership or the establish-
ment of a servitude.
Another point of interest in this case is the holding that Sec-
tion 3368 of the Revised Statutes (1870) and Act 220 of 1914,2
providing for the dedication of public roads, does not apply to
sidewalks. Being nothing more than a right-of-passage-which
is a discontinuous servitude-such sidewalk could be established
only by title.3
The case of O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Company4 brings
up the overlapping area of servitudes and torts which was dis-
cussed from both points of view in a previous symposium. 5 The
plaintiff alleged damages from defendant's operation of a carbon
plant through the escaping smoke and carbon particles. The suit
was originally instituted as a tort action, but the supreme court
brushed aside the negligence concept as inapplicable and decided
the case on the basis of the legal obligations of property owners.
Articles 667 through 669 of the Civil Code embody the servitude
which requires every property owner to use his property so as
not to injure the use of other property. Since their decision in
the Devoke case," the court seems to have adopted the servitude
approach to these situations. Neither the fact of damage nor
even knowledge is determinative, but the decision rests on a
balancing of the interests involved,' which permits the fullest
leeway in reaching proper decisions.
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
It has long been established that building restrictions may
validly be imposed on specific property so as to limit the kinds
of uses to which it can be put. Usually the same provision is
inserted in all the deeds when a subdivision is opened and indi-
vidual lots are sold. The restriction has been classed as a servi-
tude which creates a relationship between estates, and which
stays with the property through changes of ownership and
regardless of whether the limitation is mentioned or omitted in
2. La. R.S. (1950) 48:491, 48:493.
3. Arts. 727, 766, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949).
5. 8 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 236-237, 248-249 (1948).
6. Devoke v. Y. & M.V. Ry., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947).
7. See comments in section on Torts, infra p. 188.
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subsequent transfer deeds. The courts have come to describe
such a building restriction as a "covenant running with the
land," although the use of this phrase should not be taken to
incorporate all the aspects of the common law institution known
by that name.
In Holloway v. Ransome,8 the restriction that the property
must not be used "for business or commercial purposes" appeared
in some of the title deeds of the subdivision, but not in others.
The defendant showed that there was no restriction in his own
deed, nor did it appear in any of the deeds in his chain of title
to the original owner. In fact, the defendant's deed contained a
provision specifically authorizing the use of the property for
commercial purposes. The lower court sustained the restriction
on the grounds that other recorded deeds contained reference to
the lot in question as covered by the restriction, on the basis of
which the court considered that there was a general scheme or
plan to restrict all the lots in the subdivision.9
While the supreme court recognized the possibility of an
enforceable restriction being established in pursuance of a gen-
eral plan devised by an ancestor in title, it reversed the lower
court and concluded that the restriction could not be enforced
against the defendant. The absence of the restriction in all the
deeds of his title precluded its effectiveness on the lot in question.
It is difficult to see how the references in some deeds of restricted
lots could establish a servitude (restriction) on another lot for
which the deeds were all clear. The court did not indicate
whether the restriction could be enforced in the same subdivision
against an owner in whose deed it did appear. This question
raises some interesting speculation, as a result of the existence of
several unrestricted lots which might destroy the effectiveness
of the general plan.
From a practical point of view, the principal case focuses
attention on a special problem of title examination, whenever
it is necessary to assure a purchaser that there does exist a gen-
eral enforceable building restriction in the subdivision.
EMINENT DOMAIN
In expropriation proceedings there is not so much dispute
about the right to expropriate as about the value of the property
involved. Several criteria are possible; they, of course, produce
8. 216 La. 317, 43 So. 2d 673 (1949).
9. Transcript, p. 40.
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varying results. In the case of City of New Orleans v. Noto'0 the
defendant claimed a "fair valuation," citing a very recent "suc-
cession appraisal" of the same property and contending for inclu-
sion of the "replacement cost of the buildings." The court sus-
tained the city's offer of the "market value" of the lots and
improvements, defining market value as "a price which would
be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between a willing seller and
purchaser." In the present case, the determination of the market
value was based on actual sales of similar property in the imme-
diate vicinity. In the absence of such similar sales, other circum-
stances and factors would have to be considered. In any event,
the court reasserted its statement in an earlier case that replace-
ment cost is not a fair method of calculating the value of
improved property.
SALE
J. Denson Smith*
The principle that a purchaser may not be compelled to
accept a title suggestive of litigation was applied in two cases
during the 1949-1950 term. In Trasher v. Flintkote Company1 the
court refused to order a buyer specifically to perform a contract
with the plaintiff, it appearing that a prior suit by plaintiff to
quiet title brought under the supposed authority of Act 106 of
19342 was defective. This, the court found, resulted from the
fact that the mentioned act applies only to cases where the prop-
erty in question is adjudicated to an individual and not to the
state, or as held in the instant case, to a municipality. Plaintiff
had acquired title from the City of New Orleans, to which the
property had been adjudicated at a tax sale for want of bidders.
In City of New Orleans v. Ricca, the court refused to order a
defendant to purchase property from the city as the adjudicatee
in an auction sale for want of any record of ownership by an
individual. The court pointed out that such a title is suggestive
of litigation in that prescription does not run against the state or
the United States nor against minors or interdicts nor against
parties holding under any other chain of title who are not parties
to the suit.
A reduction in the price of a potato dehydrator was allowed
10. 47 So. 2d 36 (La. 1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 216 La. 73, 43 So. 2d 222 (1949).
2. La. R.S. (1950) 47:2228.
3. 217 La. 413, 46 So. 2d 505 (1950).
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